The ADS-95 drone system: a catalyst of new knowledge?
The drone engagements along the Swiss borders are part of a civil–military
agenda aimed at better managing, controlling and securing its border spaces.
The main objective of the drone system is to optimise surveillance and
identification controls. Surveillance should be understood as the
observation, monitoring and examination of a person's behaviour, travel,
itineraries and relationships, as well as the collection and processing of
information related to these actors. Identification controls, in contrast, include summonses, testimonies, certification of identity, and
recognition within a group or community by means of relatively stable
criteria (Ceyhan, 2006).
In the first analytical section, we will examine the extent to which the ADS-95 drone system enables access to new knowledge. Secondly, we will put the
“contributions” of this technology into perspective by focusing on what
limits the acquisition of knowledge and hinders the accumulation thereof.
The second analytical section will examine what this knowledge generates in
terms of surveillance practices and identification controls. We will then
assess how the mobility of the drone acts as an extension of the border
line's surveillance and identification controls within the territory, and
we will demonstrate that the flexibility of this equipment tends to transform
these practices by making them more spontaneous and “tailor-made”.
The quest for (new) knowledge: acquiring data
The role of information technology is vital in constructing knowledge (Coeckelbergh, 2013:93).
Drones – as well as radar, GPS and satellites – offer surveillance of an
unprecedented magnitude, giving access to an ever-wider and more exhaustive
mass of information. The gaze from above on contemporary society in order to
monitor its subjects and objects is becoming commonplace and plays a role
in the use of ever more efficient technologies in the hope of maximising
data acquisition. The Swiss border guards understand this, which is why they
have been using drone systems in the Swiss border space for more than 15 years. Their purpose is simple:
It [the drone] is used for surveillance, intelligence gathering or verification
of information. Our objective is to have a better knowledge of what to look for
and where to look. As it is, certain areas are better known, sometimes difficult
to access, and we may or may not be able to send field officers, depending on the
case. …Having the maximum possible information on the terrain is
of fundamental importance to us …(Head of drone engagement,
border guard, 23 September 2014).
Our interviewee thus considers the drone to be a valuable source of
information, insofar as it helps him to know what to monitor and in which
areas. This echoes the thesis of Wall and Monahan (2011:243) that “a
primary goal of drone surveillance is to collect overhead imagery that might
prove tactically useful”. While previously, information was primarily
sourced from computer databases and other security actors (police, fire
department or hospitals), the use of drones appears to be a “new” mediator
which increases the information available about individuals (who) and
objects (what) which “become things to track, monitor, apprehend”
(Wall and Monahan, 2011:246) in certain target spaces (where) via
surveillance.
The use of drones thus contributes to the acquisition of new knowledge
including, in particular, the consideration of a new spatial capital which we envisage as
the “set of resources accumulated by an actor to allow him to take
advantage, depending on his strategy, of the use of the spatial dimension of
society” (Lussault and Lévy, 2003:124). Drawing on a new spatial
capital becomes a gateway to understanding the “ordinary journeys, leisure
mobilities and migratory mobilities that construct an experience of a space,
a knowledge of the world, familiarity with places and their charms and
attractions, their accessibility, and the relationships that can be
developed there” (Loudiyi et al., 2004:7). Here, the acquisition of
this new spatial capital is promoted by devices which allow the collection
of more precise data, remotely and in real time. The border guards can then
locate and track individuals, groups or vehicles, extracting data about
their mobilities, their behaviours and their interests and their reasons for
being in a place when an identification control is carried out.
The acquisition of new knowledge is perceived positively by our
interviewees. They feel it is beneficial because their security strategies
are improving. Formerly confined to customs posts and their surroundings,
they now have the ability to observe and access hard-to-reach, remote areas,
as well as residential and industrial areas targeted by the mission. With
increased knowledge and improved practices come a (re)appropriation of
certain spaces. Convinced of these benefits, they also note that the drones
transmit information that is continually updated. This consensus on the part
of our interviewees may, however, be surprising given that the ADS-95 dates
– as the name suggests – from the 1990s. Why is this technology still
so well regarded 20 years on? According to our analysis, this is due to its
ability to produce information that remains of fundamental importance and
to respond to the demands of modern security policies that perceive certain
mobilities as sources of danger. With its thermal and infrared cameras and
sensors, the drone system offers a wealth of information with which no other
technology can compete.
Currently, types of buildings and vehicles can be recognised, and people's
silhouettes can also be observed thanks to the thermal sensors. Facial
recognition is not possible. (Head of drone engagement, border guard,
23 September 2014).
This extract enables us to take into account what the ADS-95 can make
visible (or not). Thus, we know that it offers only partial recognition of
the individuals and objects on the ground. Although “the modalities and
technicalities of the deployed aircrafts imply the extended and redefined
possibilities of vision and visualisation from above” (Klauser and
Pedrozo, 2015:286), it is not possible to obtain completely exhaustive
information. However, this need not shed negative light on the positive
views of our interviewees. Our analysis is more nuanced and agrees with
Wall and Monahan (2011:240), who state that “in practice, these
surveillance systems and their agents actively interpret ambiguous
information that continuously defies exact matches or clear responses”.
Because the technology is limited, the knowledge is still incomplete. Hence,
doubts remain, giving rise to renewed identification controls by
intervention groups. Waiting in position at various places within the border
space and within the territory, they are ready to intervene. They also move
about as requested by of the Head of Engagement who sends them to the field.
From our point of view, these controls are carried out in very systematic
ways and rarely result from a “real” need for verification in respect of an
imminent risk. Without going into more detail on this point, let us note
that this question mirrors the debates on the legitimacy of using
surveillance technology (Kennedy, 2012) and interpretive biases with
regard to the collected data (Kurgan, 2013).
The issue of data storage also merits discussion, as it influences knowledge
and practices, particularly in terms of duration. Indeed, it is clear that
the use of drones goes beyond the issue of observation and the localisation
of individuals and objects, since it makes it possible to store “traces” in
databases that have become new objects of power and knowledge for the
holding states. In this regard, our interviewees always began by discussing
the storage period for the data, such as the recordings of images and
computer data, which amounts to 30 days (source: interview with a pilot, 22 September 2014). During this period, the data are retained by the Air Force,
which then deletes them, unless they need to be stored for potential
retrospective use.
Only those images that are necessary for debriefings, training or as evidence,
for example, can be stored. The rest cannot be kept. (Drone pilot, Air Force, 23 September 2014).
Storing data in order to gain information on the moving subject therefore
appears to be an issue. Can we really ensure their “definitive” deletion,
when we know that the use of servers remains problematic and that
technologies do not “forget” (Kitchin and Dodge, 2011)? How do we justify
the need to retain images in the medium to long term? While Snowden's
revelations about the activities of the National Security Agency (NSA) bear
witness to the challenges of transparency, our interviewees say that the ADS-95 does not pose a risk. Three reasons are given. Firstly, the use of the
Swiss military drones remains sporadic and few images are retained over the
medium or long term. This is coupled with the fact that the current devices
are equipped with old technology which does not allow the acquisition of
“problematic” data, because the data are only partial (silhouettes and
shapes) and no audio is possible. Finally, the army is subject to military
security orders which should be sufficient to resolve any potential abuses.
What is important to note here is that the drone engagements allow the
acquisition and transmission of data in real time as well as in the longer
term. Consequently, the information is also mobile and flexible from the
point of view of its spatiality and its temporality and remains subject to
the “goodwill” of the actors who hold it.
This first section demonstrates that the drone system is a mediator
influencing the acquisition of new knowledge. Thus, the data collected
transform the physical territory into visual and numerical data, creating a
mass of additional information for its users. In the eyes of these users,
drones appear to be a necessary technology if they want to maximise their
knowledge and optimise surveillance as well as both air-based and land-based
identification controls. This echoes the interests of modern states in
taking over the skies by acquiring and developing new information and
communication technologies (ICTs) in order to better design their security
strategies and to exercise power from above (Williams, 2011; Aubout,
2011; Elden, 2013).
Limited knowledge
While the two previous sections demonstrate how a sociotechnical system such
as ADS-95 makes it possible to acquire new knowledge, this observation
merits qualification. Indeed, our analysis notes both technological and
human factors limiting this phenomenon.
From a technological standpoint, let us recall that the current drone system
dates back to the 1990s, which restricts, in particular, its mobility and
flexibility. While the majority of deployed military drones offer “total”
mobility over their territory as well as a flexibility of the technological
tools placed on the aircraft, this is not the case in Switzerland. For
example, there is little surveillance of any mountain regions. As for the
technological capabilities (cameras and sensors), they remain poor. Thus,
for one reason or another, access and adaptability may be restricted to
certain areas under surveillance.
Furthermore, the loud noise produced by the drones is also limiting. While
drones are often described as a stealth technology (Baconnet,
2014; Zubeldia, 2012) because their pilots are unidentifiable and they are
invisible to the “parties under surveillance”, here they can be both seen
by the naked eye and heard. Their stealth is therefore partial and calls
into question the drone's ability to sneak discreetly into the airspace.
The ADS-95 is also sensitive to unfavourable weather conditions (fog, rain)
to such an extent that it is used less in autumn and winter. Weather events
thus affect surveillance and lead to changes in trajectory, modifying the
planned surveillance areas. Climatic factors regularly lead to the
abandonment of drone engagements.
Finally, above and beyond the technological limits, the drone system
requires numerous collaborations in which each actor (pilot, border guard,
operators, analysts, maintenance team) has a specific role and depends upon
an institutional hierarchy and on strategies that distinguish it from the
other actors. Thus, these various stakeholders have their “own social
dynamics, but they are also embedded in a larger network of people and a
political context, including senior officers, intelligence analysts,
military lawyers, political actors, etc.”
(Coeckelbergh, 2013:93). In Switzerland, the engagement of a drone
system requires a staff of about 15 people, which is high, impractical to
set up and costly. This explains why the number of missions remains low, at
a rate of 10 per year and per region. Currently, the Swiss Air Force has 16 drone pilots (10 militiamen and 6 army pilots) to carry out the drone
missions. Using the ADS-95 more frequently would require the training and
engagement of new military drone pilots and therefore new financial costs.
Although this is not the purpose of this paper, we wish to point out that
the limits observed also have implications for the surveillance and
identification controls in the border space. More precisely, we find that
they generate inequality among the spaces under surveillance. Indeed, our
analysis follows the same direction as the research by Heyman (2010) and
Finn and Wright (2012), who note sociospatial inequalities arising from
the use of drones. In our case, these are produced in particular by
“systemic and routine attention practices and techniques” (Lyon, 2007:14) focused on certain areas (residential, industrial, abandoned, etc.) and
transit routes, while other areas (mountainous, too remote or close to an
airport) are avoided or even excluded from any aerial surveillance. Several
factors (technical, technological, human and even meteorological) are behind
this. Thus, whether this inequality is the result of human choice or is
imposed by external factors, it undeniably engenders a disparity in the
areas monitored and controlled by the border guards. While ADS-95 is
supposed to reduce the risks generated by modernity, is it not likely to
develop other risks by creating new forms of inequality and resulting in
certain individuals and spaces being targeted to a greater extent?
Without claiming to provide an answer to this question, it nevertheless
seems important to note that surveillance measures are set to evolve when
the Swiss Air Force uses its new drones, which are capable of
…flying higher, for longer (more than 36 hours as opposed to 4 hours currently)
and irrespective of whether it is day or night. …They will be
able to observe the entire territory. …The various sensors which
equip the ADS15 will be the latest generation. (Deputy Head of Communications, Air Force, December 2014).
The current limits of the ADS-95 could thus be exceeded, and access to new
knowledge optimised. While greater visibility of the territory will be
possible, it will be interesting to analyse how the arrival of a “new”
technology fits into a pre-existing surveillance system and how it
influences knowledge and security practices.
Consistent with the analysis in this first section, we consider military
drones to be the mediator of knowledge, which makes it possible to acquire
“new” knowledge while also limiting it. Since all knowledge is always
involved in practice, and any practice involves a certain knowledge the
reality on which it is exercised (Blot, 2005), the following section
seeks to analyse how the mobility (1) and flexibility (2) of the drone entail new surveillance
practices and identification controls.
Drone and mobility: beyond linear surveillance
Drones are fundamentally mobile objects (Graham and Hewitt, 2013). They
participate in the evolution of contemporary mobility practices promoted by
new means of production, transmission and processing of spatial information
to increase the visibility of the territory. Therefore, some authors
assimilate them with technologies intended to track “everything that moves”
(Bigo, 2011:109), to manage and control our daily mobilities (Jensen,
2016) and to monitor and control spaces such as conflict zones or border
areas (Gregory, 2011; Feldman, 2011).
Many modern states have chosen to use mobile air technology to monitor the
border area, to manage “the people who occupy it, who cross it, who wish to
enter or leave it, and who are the intended subjects of control measures”
(Deboosere and Dessouroux, 2013:4). In order to achieve their
objectives, they scrutinise certain areas which are subject to controls.
Switzerland does not escape this trend. This is illustrated by the
cartographic representation in Fig. 2, which schematises part of the geostrategic
areas over which the ADS-95 flew during the mission.
Reproduction of a “drone engagement” map
Created by Silvana Pedrozo (2016b).
![]()
This map was created from a confidential map provided by the border guards.
Generally, they produce it a few days before the mission and send it to the
Air Force pilots a few hours before the mission. This cartographic
representation is interesting because it supports one of our main results:
the mobility of the drone system gives rise to surveillance and
identification controls that extend from the border line (shown here in
light pink), via transit routes to the interior of the territory (areas
shown in blue). This analysis echoes the remarks of Raffestin, who suggests
that contemporary borders can be simultaneous, in different places and times
within the same territory (Raffestin, 1986). While the border guards that
we interviewed carried out surveillance and controls mainly at customs
posts, their areas of action expanded under the influence of new methods of
observation which influence their relationships with the environment. This
“extension” of practices is all the more interesting because it takes place
vertically and remotely (Mitchell, 2015). While Raffestin uses
two-dimensional (geometrising) concepts (points, lines, areas) to analyse territorial
relationships (Villeneuve, 1982), the fact of this “new” aerial
component, as imposed by the drone, transforms the relationships to space
into the three dimensions generated here by a more “voluminous” surveillance
of the territory. This echoes the writings which discuss the implications of
the aerial dimension in the exercise of power (Adey, 2013) as well as its
effects on the ground (Elden, 2013). Consequently, the aerial view will
entail the (re)appropriation of (new) spaces from the air, as well as highly
systematic identification controls in order to verify the reasons to explain
the presence of individuals or objects.
Furthermore, this mobile device not only offers an aerial view of that which
was fixed and mapped in advance but also promotes remote, real-time
monitoring of movements. Rather than using a fixed surveillance system in a
confined space, like a CCTV camera would (Heilmann, 2005), the border
guards demonstrate their interest in using a moving device with the capacity
to transmit, trace and update data. This entails changes in the way in which
human and non-human activities are monitored both along the border line and within the
territory. During our field observation, it was mainly vehicles and
individuals considered to be suspicious that were targeted. The border
guards seek to manage mobilities using data which facilitate their location
and behaviour through the transmission of data. There then follows a phase
in which the mobilities are evaluated, with the aim of distinguishing the
good from the bad (Amilhat-Szary, 2015; Klauser, 2012b; Amoore et al.,
2002). In our case, the “evaluators” of these mobilities were the Head of Engagement and the pilot, who interpreted all of the information. Many
authors (Bonditti, 2005; Ceyhan, 2004, 2006) have analysed the sorting
methods employed at the border. Here, it is mainly a process which results
from an interpretation of the data, as “faced with the density of the flow
of information to be processed, competent technicians are required to select
the most useful information and to analyse it. Raw data is nothing without
human added value” (Younsi, 2015:13). Thus, depending on the visual and
digital data, the Head of Engagement (in consultation with the pilot)
determines whether or not to send the field crews to carry out the
identification controls. It is interesting to note that their decisions have
never been challenged by their peers, which confirms their central and
influential position with regard to surveillance and controls. As the
surveillance and identification controls depend mainly on two individuals,
there are therefore crucial questions to consider: what about subjectivity
of interpretation and what role should it play in such activities? What are
the consequences in terms of collaborations and the legitimacy of the
“surveillance” practices?
We, therefore, suggest that there has been an evolution of surveillance
practices and identification controls since the ADS-95 has been in use.
Because of new knowledge and security practices, the controls are dispersed
and no longer follow the linear and continuous form of the border but
rather are carried out in places located throughout the territory. This
observation echoes the writings commenting on the dotty and pixelated form
of the controls (Bonditti, 2005:9) which results from the mobile
surveillance of circulations of both people and objects (Graham,
2009; Bonditti, 2011; Aas, 2005; Amoore, 2006). The limits are therefore pushed
back, multiplied and diffused over “new” spaces. Thus, our analysis agrees
with Raffestin's remarks when he suggests that the linearity of the border is more
apparent than real and that it is appreciable on maps – as illustrated
above – but remains ultimately very blurred in reality (Raffestin, 1986:8).
Drone and flexibility: spontaneous and “tailor-made”
surveillance
As we saw earlier, the drone is a mobile flying object. But it is also
characterised by its ability to adapt to many contexts and users, which
makes it fundamentally flexible (Blackmore, 2005; Crandall, 2015). Some
authors describe it as a system which allows mobile surveillance “for
greater operational flexibility” (Wall and Monahan,
2011:241). While video surveillance already enabled simultaneous
surveillance thanks to its zoom capabilities and combinations of
surveillance objects (Klauser et al., 2006), the use of drones multiplies
the number of applications thanks to the many entities that can be placed on
the device and interconnected with other technologies (Wall and Monahan,
2011; Graham and Wood, 2003; Lyon, 2006, 2007; Philippens, 2013). Cameras and
sensors are therefore emerging as new surveillance tools which reduce the
rigidity of surveillance and thus allow for more liquid, spontaneous and
tailor-made surveillance (Bauman and Lyon, 2013).
In our case study, the flexibility of surveillance and identification
controls is made possible by two entities placed on the ADS-95: cameras and
thermal sensors. As our interviewees attest, these elements are essential
because they provide multi-directional visibility, shift to different
geographic scales in seconds, and collect visual and digital data that only
the drone is currently capable of transmitting. Our interviewed pilot
described – in the first paragraph of his response – the appeal of this:
It is not the temperatures but rather the thermal emissions that can
be spotted during infrared missions. So you can tell whether a vehicle is
hot, whether it's cold, whether it's been used or not. It's very effective
for spotting people and it is very useful for us.
After the question, it is always in conjunction with a situation and there needs to
be a more precise and situation-specific analysis. We will say, if there are two
people who walk off the roadways in a residential area, that it is obviously
suspicious because it could be burglars …, it reveals information
that we assume to relate to nefarious activities. (Drone pilot, Air Force, 23 September 2014).
The first part of this quote illustrates how, by using the cameras and
sensors, our actors succeed in locating and extracting data about people and
objects. In addition to this response, the confidential records that we have
seen show that the flexibility of the drone facilitated the arrest of
migrants in disused trains, the pursuit of burglars in residential areas and
the pursuit of fleeing vehicles preparing to cross the border between France
and Switzerland. The ability of the drone to adapt to events makes it
possible to perform flexible and, therefore, more spontaneous surveillance.
Like the American Reapers, the cameras and sensors of the ADS-95 “might seem
tailor made for the task of border surveillance and assisting in the
apprehension of illegal aliens and drug smugglers crossing the border”
(Wheeler, 2012:9). Thus, the parameters of the drone are set and adjusted
depending on the data that the border guards wish to obtain (Lambeth,
2008). This is why the Swiss Air Force is seeking to maximise the
flexibility of their equipment by acquiring new drone systems.
The improvements over the current ADS-95 system include: significant
improvement in cost-utility, more flexibility in opportunities for engagement,
due to its ability to be engaged in all weather conditions, significantly better
autonomy in the air, fewer stations on the ground, less noise nuisance and
engagements without an air escort. (Swiss Confederation, 2015 Armaments Programme).
Ultimately, the use of new machines could allow a more surreptitious, yet
more continuous, surveillance of the Swiss territory. This would allow the
collection of more precise information about both individuals and objects,
completely rewriting the way in which surveillance is performed. This is
particularly pertinent in the context of modern states' quest to go beyond
regimes of “solid and heavy surveillance …fixed on specific places,
such as borders or clearly delineated physical spaces, or on previously
determined individuals” (Ceyhan, 2006:5). This is clear in the second
part of the drone pilot's response, which suggests a need to contextualise
the information gathered. Indeed, while the rigidity and fixedness of video
surveillance placed limits on the area of territory monitored, mobile and
flexible aerial surveillance provides access to a wider environment, in real
time and remotely. This makes it easier to judge a risky situation and to
relay information and thus is crucial because the relaying of information
involves the use of other security tools managed by other territorial
security actors (police, fire department, paramedics, etc.) brought in to
intervene in the field. While we consider the drone to be a mediator of
knowledge and practices, it is therefore also a mediator of collaborations.
In fact, it brings together both information and skills. As this pilot
testifies, it leads different actors to work together in the securitisation
of a space:
We work for the same cause, that is, for security.
…for every engagement that we have, we inform the cantonal police
station that we are available for if something were to happen. So it happened
…we were called by the police because there were suspicious people who
had made burglary attempts in the region of “Chênex”, near “Geneva”. We came
with the drone and we were able to [apprehend] a person, etc. So it was an example
of cooperation between the two entities, between the border guards and the cantonal
police. (Head of planning and drone engagement, border guard, 23 September 2014).
The spaces used by the border guards may therefore be spaces in which
multiple actors are located and carry out similar tasks. Like Fichet (2009), we have observed that the border guards perform tasks that were
previously entrusted mainly to the police (or even the army). They no longer
focus solely on mobilities that gravitate close to the border space but
rather monitor the entire population. Thanks to the use of a “new” aerial
technology, which is more mobile and flexible, professional boundaries are
blurring, skill sets are converging and the spaces which must be secured are
being shared. The example of airspace security during Euro 2008 in
Switzerland bears witness to this fact, as the ADS-95 was used to fly over
Basel, Bern and Zurich. The use of drones therefore redefines the
relationships between actors from the various spheres, echoing the writings
of Raffestin (1986), who suggests that relationships are vectors of exchange
and collaboration.
Consequently, the entire drone system, including the security actors that
are directly and indirectly involved, is becoming more flexible in order to
adapt to the mission. While previously, certain interventions typically came
under the aegis of a specific security actor (communal or cantonal police,
border guards, army, private actors), the use of drones is decreasing this
trend and favouring a convergent collaborative process. Territorial and
professional limits are thus becoming less rigid, more flexible and are
being constantly redefined. We might therefore ask ourselves to what extent
these limits will diminish or be reinforced in the future, as the arrival of
the new drones presupposes a new technological flexibility that will give
rise to new sociospatial, collaborative and monitoring practices.